Charles Goodhart, Dimitri Tsomocos, Xuan Wang, 07 August 2020

A sizeable proportion of enterprises, especially SMEs, in receipt of financial assistance from the government will fail to repay. This column asks whether, and to what extent, it may be beneficial to apply a screening mechanism to deter those mostly likely to fail to repay from seeking financial assistance in the first place. The answer largely turns on the relative weights attached for the objectives of stabilisation as compared with allocative efficiency.

Michael Geruso, Timothy J. Layton, Grace McCormack, Mark Shepard, 16 November 2019

Sicker consumers tend to exhibit higher demand for health insurance, which drives up costs. This column argues that this adverse selection takes place along two margins: whether to buy insurance at all and how much coverage to buy, It develops a new framework that incorporates both selection margins, and shows that policies aimed at addressing one margin can often exacerbate selection along the other. It is therefore vital for optimal policy to consider both margins simultaneously. 

Camille Landais, Arash Nekoei, J Peter Nilsson, David Seim, Johannes Spinnewijn, 03 February 2018

Unemployment insurance is compulsory in almost all countries, with no choice for workers over the level of coverage. But why restrict choice if it can improve the targeting of individuals who value the insurance the most? This column uses evidence from Sweden to examine whether the issue of adverse selection justifies a universal mandate for unemployment insurance. Workers who purchased more generous unemployment insurance were more than twice as likely to be unemployed in the following year. A universal mandate combats such adverse selection, but forces workers to buy insurance even when insurance costs are higher than the value they assign to it.

Kuniyoshi Saito, Daisuke Tsuruta, 14 November 2014

In Japan, loans with 100% guarantees account for more than half of all loans covered by public credit guarantee schemes, but banks claim that they do not offer loans without sufficient screening and monitoring even if the loans are guaranteed. This column presents evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in Japanese credit guarantee schemes. The problem is less severe for loans with 80% guarantees.

Marius Zoican, 20 September 2014

Technological advances in equity markets entered the spotlight following the Flash Crash of May 2010. This column analyses the advantages and disadvantages of algorithmic and high-frequency trading. Ever-faster exchanges do not always improve liquidity. Following a speed upgrade in the Nordic equity markets, effective spreads posted by high-frequency traders increased by 32%.

Daniel Bennett, Wes Yin, 14 August 2014

Many drugs sold in poor countries are counterfeit or substandard, endangering patients’ health and fostering drug resistance. Since drug quality is difficult to observe, pharmacies in weakly regulated markets may have little incentive to improve quality. However, larger markets allow firms to reorganise production and invest in technologies that reduce the marginal cost of quality. This column discusses how the entry of a new pharmacy chain in India led incumbents to both cut prices and raise drug quality.

Alex Edmans, William Mann, 15 February 2014

All firms need capital. Much research addresses the choice between issuing various types of securities – for example, between issuing debt and equity. However, another method of financing has received relatively little attention – selling non-core assets, such as property, divisions, or financial investments. This article explains the conditions under which an asset sale is the preferred means of raising capital, and highlights how a manager should go about deciding between selling assets and issuing securities.

Maitreesh Ghatak, Madhav Aney, Massimo Morelli, 18 August 2011

Political economists study how distortions in political access can lead to policies that lead to market failures. The authors of CEPR DP8533 examine the reverse link, mapping out how market failures could create political cleavages which can then amplify the market failure by voting for bad policies.


CEPR Policy Research