Michele Lanotte, Pietro Tommasino, 05 February 2018

Late last year, the Basel Committee decided to maintain the status quo regarding regulation of banks’ sovereign debt holdings. This column summarises the reasons to be cautious of stricter regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures. Theory and experience suggest small net benefits from such a reform, with possible increases in tail risks. The best instrument to tackle the problem is not microprudential regulation, but sounder public finances and the completion of the banking union.

Thomas Huertas, María Nieto, 18 March 2014

The European Resolution Fund is intended to reach €55 billion – much less than the amount of public assistance required by individual institutions during the recent financial crisis. This column argues that the Resolution Fund can nevertheless be large enough if it forms part of a broader architecture resting on four pillars: prudential regulation and supervision, ‘no forbearance’, adequate ‘reserve capital’, and provision of liquidity to the bank-in-resolution. By capping the Resolution Fund, policymakers have reinforced the need to ensure that investors, not taxpayers, bear the cost of bank failures.

Hans Gersbach, 12 October 2011

The way in which monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and microprudential regulation of banks should be organised and conducted is a major, as yet unresolved, issue. In CEPR Policy Insight No.58, the author outlines a policy framework for addressing this issue.

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