Guido Tabellini, 16 July 2018

A key question in the debate on the reform of the euro area concerns the right mix between risk sharing and market discipline. This column, part of the VoxEU debate on the topic, argues that proposals to enhance market discipline in the euro area are counter-productive, because they increase the vulnerabilities of countries with high legacy debts. 

Paul De Grauwe, Yuemei Ji, 19 March 2018

A number of economists and officials have recently proposed different schemes aimed at using financial markets to impose the right amount of discipline in the euro area. This column argues that this would not eliminate the inherent instability of the sovereign bond markets in a monetary union. During crises this instability becomes systemic, and no amount of financial engineering can stabilise an otherwise unstable system.

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This online seminar will argue that market discipline and risk sharing should be viewed as complementary pillars of the euro area financial architecture, rather than as substitutes. Achieving this complementarity, however, is not easy. It calls for stabilisation and insurance mechanisms that are both effective and cannot give rise to permanent transfers. And it requires a reformed institutional framework. 

Against this background, the seminar will present and discuss the recent Euro Area reform proposal formulated in a CEPR Policy Insight by a group of independent French and German economists with differing views and political sensitivities but a shared conviction that the current deadlock must be overcome.

Xavier Vives, 17 March 2015

The 2007–08 crisis revealed regulatory failures that had allowed the shadow banking system and systemic risk to grow unchecked. This column evaluates recent proposals to reform the banking industry. Although appropriate pricing of risk should make activity restrictions redundant, there may nevertheless be complementarities between these two approaches. Ring-fencing may make banking groups more easily resolvable and therefore lower the cost of imposing market discipline.

Xavier Freixas, Christian Laux, 17 April 2012

Faith in market discipline has been shattered by the financial crisis. This column argues that the failure of market discipline has different roots. It points to a lack of transparency and efficiency, particularly when it is needed most. In order to rectify this, however, it is not enough to merely increase the provision and disclosure of information. Instead, transparency depends on how that information is interpreted and used.

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CEPR Policy Research