Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, 27 July 2014

The monetary policies implemented by the Federal Reserve since late 2008 have raised concerns about the risk taking of financial institutions. This column discusses the effect of some of these policies on life insurance companies and market mutual funds. While the effect on life insurance companies has been stabilising, money market funds did not actively reach for yield.

Markus K Brunnermeier, Yuliy Sannikov, 03 June 2014

Eurozone monetary policy transmission is broken. A key aspect of this is the failure of credit to get to small and medium enterprises, and consumers. This column uses the ‘I theory of money’ to diagnosis the problem and propose ‘prudently designed’ asset-backed securitisation as the cure. This would transform illiquid SME and consumer loans into a liquid asset class that would broaden the transmission mechanism while providing a lasting intermediation market for this segment in the Eurozone.

Mark Mink, Jakob de Haan, 24 May 2014

To date, much uncertainty exists about how large the spillovers would be from the default of a systemically important bank. This column shows evidence that the market values of US and EU banks hardly respond to changes in the default risk of banks that the Financial Stability Board considers globally systemically important (G-SIBs). However, changes in all G-SIBs’ default risk explain a substantial part of changes in bank market values. These findings have implications for financial-crisis management and prevention policies.

Dennis Reinhardt, Steven Riddiough, 07 May 2014

Cross-border funding between banks collapsed following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, but the withdrawal of funding was not uniform across countries. This column argues that the composition of cross-border bank-to-bank funding can help to explain why. Interbank funding between unrelated banks is particularly vulnerable to global shocks, but intragroup funding between related banks can act as a stabilising force, particularly for advanced economies with a high share of global parent banks. Policymakers should look at disaggregated cross-border bank-to-bank flows, as doing otherwise could result in a misleading assessment of financial stability risks.

Martin Brown, Stefan Trautmann, Razvan Vlahu, 10 April 2014

Contagious bank runs are an important source of systemic risk. However, with observational data it is near-impossible to disentangle the contagion of bank runs from other potential causes of correlated deposit withdrawals across banks. This column discusses an experimental investigation of the mechanisms behind contagion. The authors find that panic-based deposit withdrawals can be strongly contagious across banks, but only if depositors know that the banks are economically related.

Rhiannon Sowerbutts, Ilknur Zer, Peter Zimmerman, 05 April 2014

Inadequate disclosure by banks increased funding costs and contributed to the recent crisis. This column presents quantitative indices to measure progress of disclosure between banks and over time. Internationally, disclosure has improved since 2000. However, more information alone is not sufficient to solve the problem. More needs to be done to ensure that the information provided is useful to investors, and that investors are incentivised to use this information. The ongoing reform agenda aims to address this.

Willem Buiter, 16 January 2012

The global crisis inaugurated a new era for central banks in the advanced economies, when their conventional role as interest rate-setters and lenders and market makers of last resort expanded. Central banks have become the custodians of stability for financial markets – a role for which they lack both democratic accountability and political legitimacy, argues Willem Buiter in DP8780. He decries the new “perverse division of labour” between central banks and fiscal authorities and appeals for a reassessment of this pathological arrangement.

Iman van Lelyveld, Marco Spaltro, 27 October 2011

The dissent brewing throughout Europe hinges on the question of whether the financial burdens of the Eurozone crisis should be shared between weak and strong. This column presents a new paper arguing that the wealthier, more stable economies don’t have much choice.

Barry Eichengreen, Eswar Prasad, Raghuram Rajan, 20 September 2011

Central banks have massively broadened their remit in recent crisis-laden years, but the standard analytic framework – ‘flexible inflation targeting’ – has not changed. This column argues that it is time to properly flesh out an alternative framework. Financial stability should be an explicit mandate of central banks, and international coordination among central banks should be boosted by forming a small group of systemically significant central banks that regularly meets and issues reports to the G20 on their financial-stability policies.

Itai Agur, Maria Demertzis, 13 January 2011

What institutions should be responsible for financial stability? Do governments need distinct regulators for distinct objectives or should central banks pursue both price stability and financial stability? This column argues that monetary policy inevitably will involve considerations of financial stability due to its effects on banks' risk taking and says that central banks should embrace this dual role.

Pierre Monnin, Terhi Jokipii, 07 October 2010

Does banking sector instability damage the real economy? Or the other way round? This column presents data from 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2008. It finds that banking sector stability appears to be an important driver of GDP growth in subsequent quarters. It argues that monetary policy should therefore pay more attention to banking sector soundness.

Ricardo Caballero, 14 January 2010

Global imbalances have been suggested as the root cause of the global crisis. This column argues that another imbalance is the guilty party. The entire world had an insatiable demand for safe debt instruments that put an enormous pressure on the US financial system and its incentives. This structural problem can be alleviated if governments around the world explicitly absorb a larger share of the systemic risk.

Hyun Song Shin, 18 March 2009

Did securitisation disperse risks? This column argues that it undermined financial stability by concentrating risk. Securitisation allowed banks to leverage up in tranquil times while concentrating risks in the banking system by inducing banks and other financial intermediaries to buy each other’s securities with borrowed money.

Luigi Spaventa, 28 January 2009

To fix the world financial system, the G20 needs to look at some bold institutional reforms. The column suggests an international financial stability charter backed up by an new institution that could either be ‘light’ with a slim secretariat, or more elaborate WTO-style organisation.

Roland Spahr, 18 November 2008

Globally integrated countries have suffered heavily from highly volatile stock markets during the current crisis. This column argues that globalised countries enjoy lower stock market risk in good times, but they suffer just as much in crises. Moreover, the transition to openness breeds financial instability. Policymakers need ways to manage these risk concerns.

Charles Goodhart, 24 June 2008

Central banks cannot achieve price and financial stability with one instrument (interest rates). A counter-cyclical regulatory system is needed to dampen asset booms and to smooth busting bubbles. To use such macro-prudential instruments effectively, regulators need courage, quantitative triggers, and independence; they will be criticised by lenders, borrowers and politicians in both booms and busts.

Xavier Vives, 31 March 2008

The current crisis is a modern form of a traditional banking crisis. The 125-year-old Bagehot's doctrine tells us how governments should react – lend to solvent but illiquid financial institutions. While easy to state, the doctrine is hard to apply. The key question to assess the future consequences of current central bank policy is whether the subprime mortgage crisis arises in the context of a moderate or a severe underlying moral hazard problem.

Carmen Reinhart, 15 March 2008

We may just have started to feel the pain. Asset price drops – including housing – are common markers in all the big banking crises over the past 30 years. GDP declines after such crises were both large (-2% on average) and protracted (2 years to return to trend); in the 5 biggest crises, the numbers were -5% and 3 years. This column, based on the author’s testimony to the Congress, picks through the causes and consequences. It argues that when it comes to ‘cures,’ it would be far better to get the job done right than get the job done quickly.

Willem Buiter, 05 March 2008

This second column on the Treasury Committee’s report on lessons from Northern Rock discusses the institutional arrangements needed to cope should a bank of non-trivial size fail.

Willem Buiter, 04 March 2008

The UK Treasury Committee recently released a report on the lessons from the plight of Northern Rock. In the first of a two-column series, Willem Buiter analyses the shortcomings of the report’s recommendations for reducing problems in the banking and ‘shadow banking’ sectors.



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