Hans Gersbach, 27 February 2016

Current office-holders often seem to be re-elected quite easily, irrespective of their performance. This ‘incumbency advantage’ make it harder for first-time candidates and undermines democratic competition. This column proposes a new rule for re-election – the score-replication rule. In its simplest form, such a rule would require incumbents to obtain a percentage of votes at least as high as their highest historical election performance. This would restrain the negative incumbency advantage and potentially reduce policy polarisation.

Alberto Alesina, Traviss Cassidy, Ugo Troiano, 22 March 2015

Different characteristics of a politician could affect policy. Whereas existing studies analyse gender and education, this column discusses the effect of a politician’s age on governance and re-election. Younger mayors are more likely to strategically increase expenditures and attract more transfers from the higher levels of government right before the election. These fiscal cycles are positively correlated with re-election and, hence, potentially explain why younger mayors are more likely to be re-elected. 


CEPR Policy Research