Thorsten Beck, Consuelo Silva-Buston, Wolf Wagner, 13 March 2018

International cooperation on bank supervision is still rare. This column analyses data on supervisory cooperation among a global sample of countries between 1995 and 2013 to show that cooperation among bank supervisors is not always optimal. Country pairs with higher cross-border externalities and lower heterogeneity are more likely to cooperate, and in more intense ways, but for some country pairs the costs of cooperation outweigh the benefits.

Supreet Kaur, 08 February 2018

Eugenio Proto, Aldo Rustichini, Andis Sofianos, 19 January 2018

Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

Benjamin Enke, 21 September 2017

Daily life requires us to cooperate with a large number of – potentially unrelated – people. This column argues that cultural variation in the ways people cooperate with each other are empirically associated with fundamentally different religious beliefs, moral values, emotions of shame and guilt, social norms, and institutions. This suggests that various psychological, biological, and institutional mechanisms co-evolved to support specific social cooperation systems.

Marco Buti, Helene Bohn-Jespersen, 25 November 2016

The actions taken in 2008-09 by the G20 avoided an outright depression during the financial crisis, but questions remain over its ability to evolve from a short-term crisis response forum to effectively addressing more long-term challenges. This column argues that to ‘win the peace', G20 members as well as G20 Presidencies have to redesign international economic policy coordination, and ensure that the focus is kept on a limited number of deliverables to which all G20 members can agree.

Joshua Aizenman, 03 January 2016

The Global Crisis renewed debate on the benefits and limitations of coordinating international macro policies. This column highlights the rare conditions that lead to international cooperation, along with the potential benefits for the global economy. In normal times, deeper macro cooperation among countries is associated with welfare gains of a second-order magnitude, making the odds of cooperation low. When bad tail events induce imminent and correlated threats of destabilised financial markets, the perceived losses have a first-order magnitude. The apprehension of these losses in times of peril may elicit rare and beneficial macro cooperation.

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