Thomas Keywood, Jörg Baten, 07 December 2019

Due to their lower standards of living, Eastern and Central Eastern Europe are losing their young, well-educated and energetic population to the West. The scarcity of data that reach far enough back in time makes it challenging to explain the longstanding East–West differences. This column explores the relationship of economic development with human capital – specifically, elite numeracy – and violence. It concludes that the absence of violence played a significant role in economic development through elite numeracy formation.

Laurence Boone, Debora Revoltella, 06 December 2019

For the past two years, global growth outcomes and prospects have steadily deteriorated, while investment growth has collapsed. This is particularly the case in Europe. This column argues that reducing policy uncertainty, rethinking fiscal policy, and acting vigorously to address the challenges raised by digitalisation, climate change, and persistent inequalities all have the potential to reverse the current slippery trend and lift investment and living standards. 

Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Tobias Ketterer, 18 November 2019

Institutions are an important ingredient for economic growth. Using data from European regions for the period 1999-2013, this column shows that government quality matters for regional growth, and that relative improvements in the quality of government are a powerful driver of development. One-size-fits-all policies for lagging regions are not the solution. Government quality improvements are essential for low-growth regions, and in low-income regions, basic endowment shortages are still the main barrier to development. 

Cevat Giray Aksoy, Panu Poutvaara, 05 September 2019

About 1.4 million refugees and irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016, but little is known about their socio-demographic characteristics and motivations. This column presents the first large-scale evidence on why those who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 and 2016 had left their home countries. While the vast majority were escaping conflict, the main motivation for a significant number of migrants from countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Pakistan was a desire to seek out better economic opportunities. People who are educated to secondary or tertiary level are more likely to migrate than people with lower levels of education, particularly when fleeing a major conflict, and these people are more likely to head for countries that have more comprehensive migrant integration policies.

Cormac Ó Gráda, 02 September 2019

Of WWII’s warring powers only the Soviet Union suffered mass starvation, but as this column, part of a Vox debate on the economics of WWII, describes, it is a measure of the war’s global reach that 20 to 25 million civilians died of hunger or hunger-related diseases outside Europe. In Britain effective rationing ensured a ‘fair’ distribution of food supplies throughout the war and in Germany the famine conditions experienced in 1918-19 were not replicated, but Japan was facing semi-starvation at war’s end. In Europe, apart from Greece and the Soviet Union, famine mortality was modest, but 3-5% of the populations of faraway Bengal, Henan, and Java perished. 

Gianmarco Ottaviano, 03 July 2019

Economic geography strikes back. After a couple of decades of easy talk about the ‘death of distance’ in the age of globalisation, the promise of a world of rising living standards for all is increasingly challenged by the resilience of regional disparities within countries. As long as many people and firms are not geographically mobile – and those who are tend to be the most skilled and productive – easier distant interactions can actually strengthen rather than weaken agglomeration economies. Recent electoral trends in Europe can be understood to a surprisingly large extent from this angle. 

Karl Aiginger, 20 April 2019

Populism represents a challenge to liberal democracy, pluralism, human rights, and the exchange of ideas. This column examines the features and drivers of populism, as well as the potential strategic response by the EU and its member states. This includes a vision for Europe to become the role model for high-income societies providing well-being, lower unemployment, and less inequality, and a leader in decarbonisation and public sector management.

Mónica Correa-López, Beatriz de Blas, 23 April 2019

Since the end of WWII, advanced economies have experienced long-lasting swings in economic activity. This column takes a look at the historical data and finds that, over the medium term, output and investment fluctuations among European countries have been even more volatile and persistent than in the US. It also reveals that, by diffusing embodied technology through trade inintermediates, large US firms appear to drive Europe's output over the medium term. 

Alberto Alesina, Elie Murard, Hillel Rapoport, 08 April 2019

A large literature shows that generosity, both public and private, is more freely extended within the same group rather than across groups. This column examines how immigration affects natives’ attitudes towards redistribution and the implications for welfare states in Europe. The main finding is that in regions which have received a larger share of immigrants, natives are in general less favourable towards redistribution. Some European countries face the dilemma of natives favouring generous welfare policies for themselves but opposing them for immigrants.

Guido Friebel, Miriam Manchin, Mariapia Mendola, Giovanni Prarolo, 02 February 2019

There is a general understanding that illegal migration only exists because of the smuggling industry. However, there is no reliable information on how migrants’ intent to leave their home country and come to Europe, for example, depends on the availability of smuggling services. This column uses data on migrant flows arriving at European borders after the effective opening to Libyan refugees of the central Mediterranean migration route, following the 2011 fall of the Gaddafi regime, to estimate the supply elasticity of the lucrative smuggling industry. Findings indicate that when the smuggling distance between country-pairs gets shorter, there is an increase in individual intentions to migrate.

Jacques Bughin, Christopher Pissarides, 02 January 2019

Europe’s social contracts to protect their citizens from socioeconomic risks are based on an inclusive growth model characterised by a more egalitarian view of revenue generation and distribution. But this model is under strain, with various global trends placing upward pressure on inequality that could intensify. This column suggests that keeping the essence of Europe’s current inclusive growth model does not preclude it from adapting its current social contracts to protect its citizens, whatever the disruptions that lie ahead.

Pierluigi Bologna, Arianna Miglietta, Anatoli Segura, 29 October 2018

Proponents of contingent convertible bonds, or CoCos, argue that they are effective instruments for bank recapitalisation. Sceptics argue that they introduce too much complexity, with potentially destabilising consequences. This column addresses this dispute empirically, using the dynamics of the CoCo market in 2016. The CoCo market at the time exhibited adverse dynamics that can’t be explained by banks’ fundamentals. Though some of this instability may have been transitory, the findings imply that the market should be monitored as it develops.

Joan Rosés, Nikolaus Wolf, 20 July 2018

Inequality between Europe's regions has risen in the last few decades. Joan Rosés and Nikolaus Wolf discuss their research on inequality at both the personal and regional levels across Europe in the last century. Rising regional inequality is one factor behind the growing populism in Europe.

Nauro Campos, 22 June 2018

The issue of how to reform the EU is well discussed in research and policy. But through which institutions and in which order these reforms should take place is less well debated. Nauro Campos discusses the role of Europe’s institutions in its successes and failures. Based on the findings of the recent CEPR eBook, “Bretton Woods, Brussels, and Beyond: Redesigning the Institutions of Europe”, he suggests that the risks of not reforming these institutions are at least another recession across Europe, but also threats to the European project itself.

Nikolaus Wolf, 11 June 2018

Ashoka Mody, 01 April 2018

Luigi Guiso, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, Tommaso Sonno, 18 May 2018

There has been some disagreement over the roots of the recent rise of populism in Europe. This column examines variations in exposure to economic shocks and in ability to react to them in different regions of Europe to show that the cultural backlash against globalisation has been driven by economic woes. In regions where globalisation was present but that have benefited economically, there has been no such backlash and the populist message has retreated. The message is clear: if one wants to defeat populism, one must defeat first economic insecurity.

Philipp-Bastian Brutscher, Jonas Heipertz, Christopher Hols, 23 April 2018

Despite an extensive literature examining the optimal financing mix, little work exists on firms’ preferences over specific debt financing characteristics. This column uses experimental data from Europe to analyse the link between different external financing characteristics and investment decisions. The findings suggest that modest improvements in financing terms can more than double the probability of investment. Investment decisions are particularly sensitive to interest rates and collateral requirements.

Barry Eichengreen, 06 April 2018

Problems that have recently been faced by Europe's financial system - from highly variable exchange rates to disrupted trade flows - also plagued advanced economies a century ago. Barry Eichengreen compares the problems of the Gold Standard to the European Monetary System, and the euro area. 

Joan Rosés, Nikolaus Wolf, 14 March 2018

A recent literature has explored growing personal wealth inequality in countries around the world. This column explores the widening wealth gap between regions and across states in Europe. Using data going back to 1900, it shows that regional convergence ended around 1980 and the gap has been growing since then, with capital regions and declining industrial regions at the two extremes. This rise in regional inequality, combined with rising personal inequality, has played a significant role in the recent populist backlash.

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