Miguel Ampudia, Thorsten Beck, Andreas Beyer, Jean-Edouard Colliard, Agnese Leonello, Angela Maddaloni, David Marques-Ibanez, 20 September 2019

The decade since the Global Crisis has seen notable changes in the architecture of supervision, with separation of responsibility for monetary and financial stability having been reversed in many countries on the one hand, and a move towards more cross-border cooperation between supervisors on the other. This column discusses these two trends in Europe, where responsibility for supervision of the largest banks is housed in the same authority with responsibility for monetary policy, the ECB. It argues that the Single Supervisory Mechanism is a good reflection of the subtle economics of supervisory architecture and the many trade-offs that have to be taken into account.

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, 09 April 2018

A team of French and German economists recently proposed on this site a series of reforms to strengthen the euro area's institutional framework. This column, which joins VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, argues that while the proposals  form a useful basis for discussion, they are nevertheless subject to important shortcomings.

Giacomo Calzolari, Jean-Edouard Colliard, Gyöngyi Lóránth, 30 July 2016

The presence of multiple national authorities in the EU poses substantial coordination problems for the supervision of multinational banks. The Single Supervisory Mechanism aims to solve the resulting coordination failures. This column explores how banks could strategically react to the introduction of a supranational supervisor. The banking system is likely to endogenously react by reverting to an organisational form for which supranational supervision is actually less essential.

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