Treb Allen, Caue Dobbin, Melanie Morten, 14 January 2019

A vigorous debate exists about the economic benefits of building a border wall between the US and Mexico. Yet, empirical evidence to guide the debate has lagged behind. This column studies the economic impact of the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which built 550 new miles of fence on the US–Mexico border. At a construction cost of $7 per person, the fence led to a small reduction in migration but had negligible effects on the economy, with high-skilled US workers losing $4.60 per year in income, and low-skilled US workers gaining just $0.36 per year. 

Jeffrey Frankel, 08 January 2019

Simon Evenett, Johannes Fritz, 14 December 2018

Presidents Trump and Xi effectively declared a truce in their trade war at the recent G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, giving their trade negotiators three months to settle their differences. This column argues that focusing on the bilateral trade war overlooks similarities in the trade distortions facing Chinese and American exporters worldwide in the form of export incentives, subsidies to domestic firms, and import tariff increases. It concludes that these two trading giants have more in common than they may realise.

Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, Tristan Kohl, 01 December 2018

Axel Dreher, Valentin Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland, 24 November 2018

Countries that vote with the US when serving on the UN Security Council also receive more financial assistance. This column uses voting records in the Council to show that when these countries were US allies, they received more in US aid, but when the countries were not natural allies, they received more financial assistance from US-dominated international institutions instead.

Chad Bown, 30 October 2018

President Trump’s protectionism has a distinctive focus on disrupting US access to global supply chains. This column reveals that the major economies had in fact begun to impose additional trade protection on intermediate inputs even prior to 2016. New barriers targeting cross-border supply chains simply arose through policies aside from headline tariffs. Some of this new protection has also already spread beyond China’s trade and begun to cover exports from other countries. These results, combined with more recent policy actions, widen the possibility of a negative protectionist impact on the global sourcing of parts and components.

Stefano Ramelli, Alexander Wagner, Richard Zeckhauser, Alexandre Ziegler, 29 October 2018

President Trump’s election and the nomination of Scott Pruitt to lead the Environmental Protection Agency changed expectations of US climate change policy. This column uses movements in US stock prices to show that firms with high carbon intensity benefited, as expected, but so did firms with ‘responsible’ strategies on climate change. A significant group of investors raise the value of firms taking a long-term perspective. 

Christopher Knittel, 11 October 2018

Menzie Chinn, 08 October 2018

Lubos Pastor, Pietro Veronesi, 28 September 2018

The vote for Brexit and the election of protectionist Donald Trump to the US presidency – two momentous markers of the ongoing pushback against globalisation – led some to question the rationality of voters. This column presents a framework that demonstrates how the populist backlash against globalisation is actually a rational voter response when the economy is strong and inequality is high. It highlights the fragility of globalisation in a democratic society that values equality.

Andrew Rose, 18 September 2018

The export consequences of a country’s leadership style are one manifestation of ‘soft power’.  This column uses Gallup’s World Poll data and a gravity model of trade to examine the link between the attractiveness of the US to foreigners under the Trump administration and US exports. The results suggest a decline in foreign approval of US leadership between 2016 (Obama’s last year) and 2017 (Trump’s first year) may have lowered US exports by at least 0.2% or, over $3 billion.

Peter T. Leeson, 01 September 2018

President Trump frequently refers to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into possible Russian collusion during the 2016 presidential election as a 'witch hunt'. This column argues that competition might be behind both this current ‘witch hunt’ and Europe’s ‘witch craze’, which between 1520 and 1700 claimed the lives at least 40,000 people. Today it is competition between Democrats and Republicans; in 16th and 17th century Europe, it was competition between Catholicism and Protestantism in post-Reformation Christendom.

Yi Huang, Chen Lin, Sibo Liu, Heiwai Tang, 10 August 2018

Tariffs intended to reduce competition from foreign firms can backfire by also raising the costs of imported inputs for domestic firms. This column examines the market responses to the Trump administration’s initial and subsequent announcements of tariffs on imports from China. US firms that are more dependent on exports to and imports from China experienced lower stock and bond returns but higher default risks around the date of the announcement. Firms’ indirect exposure to US-China trade through domestic input-output linkages affects their responses to the announcements. 

Chad Bown, Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, 31 July 2018

Dennis Novy, 27 July 2018

When President Trump recently spoke of his hope for "a great bilateral trade agreement” with the UK after Brexit, what did he really mean? Dennis Novy of the University of Warwick describes what these political good intentions may look like in reality, the problems that both sides will have to solve to agree a UK-US deal, and the factors that might derail any agreement.

Chad Bown, Euijin Jung, Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, 26 July 2018

Simon Wren-Lewis, 20 July 2018

Benjamin Born, Gernot Müller, Moritz Schularick, Petr Sedláček, 18 July 2018

Growth and employment in the US have been robust over the past 18 months, and President Trump frequently takes personal credit for these trends. This column explores how the US economy would have evolved without Trump. An analysis shows no difference between the post-election performance of the US economy under Trump and a synthetic ‘doppelganger’ US economy without Trump, suggesting that there has been no ‘Trump effect’.  

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