Andrew Rose, 18 September 2018

The export consequences of a country’s leadership style are one manifestation of ‘soft power’.  This column uses Gallup’s World Poll data and a gravity model of trade to examine the link between the attractiveness of the US to foreigners under the Trump administration and US exports. The results suggest a decline in foreign approval of US leadership between 2016 (Obama’s last year) and 2017 (Trump’s first year) may have lowered US exports by at least 0.2% or, over $3 billion.

Peter T. Leeson, 01 September 2018

President Trump frequently refers to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into possible Russian collusion during the 2016 presidential election as a 'witch hunt'. This column argues that competition might be behind both this current ‘witch hunt’ and Europe’s ‘witch craze’, which between 1520 and 1700 claimed the lives at least 40,000 people. Today it is competition between Democrats and Republicans; in 16th and 17th century Europe, it was competition between Catholicism and Protestantism in post-Reformation Christendom.

Yi Huang, Chen Lin, Sibo Liu, Heiwai Tang, 10 August 2018

Tariffs intended to reduce competition from foreign firms can backfire by also raising the costs of imported inputs for domestic firms. This column examines the market responses to the Trump administration’s initial and subsequent announcements of tariffs on imports from China. US firms that are more dependent on exports to and imports from China experienced lower stock and bond returns but higher default risks around the date of the announcement. Firms’ indirect exposure to US-China trade through domestic input-output linkages affects their responses to the announcements. 

Chad Bown, Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, 31 July 2018

Dennis Novy, 27 July 2018

When President Trump recently spoke of his hope for "a great bilateral trade agreement” with the UK after Brexit, what did he really mean? Dennis Novy of the University of Warwick describes what these political good intentions may look like in reality, the problems that both sides will have to solve to agree a UK-US deal, and the factors that might derail any agreement.

Chad Bown, Euijin Jung, Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, 26 July 2018

Simon Wren-Lewis, 20 July 2018

Benjamin Born, Gernot Müller, Moritz Schularick, Petr Sedláček, 18 July 2018

Growth and employment in the US have been robust over the past 18 months, and President Trump frequently takes personal credit for these trends. This column explores how the US economy would have evolved without Trump. An analysis shows no difference between the post-election performance of the US economy under Trump and a synthetic ‘doppelganger’ US economy without Trump, suggesting that there has been no ‘Trump effect’.  

Simon Wren-Lewis, 16 July 2018

Gabriel Felbermayr, Jens Südekum, 28 June 2018

Jeffrey Frankel, 27 June 2018

Chad Bown, Euijin Jung, Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, 19 June 2018

Pascal Lamy, 06 June 2018

Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Tho Pham, Oleksandr Talavera, 02 June 2018

The rise of social media has profoundly affected how people acquire and process information. Using Twitter data on the Brexit referendum and the 2016 US presidential election, this column studies how social media bots shape public opinion and voting outcomes. Bots have a tangible effect on the tweeting activity of humans, but the degree of their influence depends on whether they provide information consistent with humans’ priors. The findings suggest that effect of bots was likely marginal, but possibly large enough to affect voting outcomes in the two elections.

Stefan Gerlach, 04 April 2018

It was generally expected that the new US administration’s economic policies would lead to an appreciation of the US dollar. Yet the opposite has happened. This column argues that a large part of the fluctuations of the US dollar against the euro since the election of President Trump can be tied to movements in the relative attractiveness of holding US dollars versus the euro.

Chad Bown, 08 March 2018

President Trump’s announced intention to impose import tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminium touched off a wave of retaliation threats and trade policy responses from trading partners, including the EU. This column examines the scope for retaliation against the Trump administration’s proposed tariffs under WTO dispute settlement. It estimates that if the sources of all US steel and aluminium imports were part of this dispute, trading partners would be permitted to retaliate by a collective amount of $14.2 billion per year.

Simon Evenett, Johannes Fritz, 24 January 2018

On 22 January 2018, President Trump imposed safeguard duties on imported washing machines and solar panels and cells. This column analyses import surges into the US from 2006 to 2016 to put these tariff increases in perspective. Using a simple, theory-inspired method for identifying surges, it finds that during 2014-6 a category of manufactured good in the US had a one-in-32 chance of witnessing an import surge each year. US import surges aren’t concentrated in sectors where China has severe excess capacity either.

Sijbren Cnossen, Arjan Lejour, Maarten van ’t Riet, 24 November 2017

Some US multinationals have displayed a willingness to relinquish their American nationality and move their headquarters abroad. Such ‘inversions’ generally aim to avoid and minimise taxes. This column argues that the new Trump tax plan is likely to halt tax inversions by US multinationals. However, the plan will increase treaty shopping, incentivising multinationals to redirect dividends through third-party countries with generous tax treaties.

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