Simeon Djankov, Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, 09 July 2021

The economic shock triggered by Covid-19 shut down thousands of businesses and cost millions of workers their jobs. The goal of government response to this shock was simple: keep the lights on for as long as possible. This column describes how while some advanced economies have moved ahead with changes in their bankruptcy law to make it easier for distressed companies to keep running, developing countries have not reformed their procedures. A possible solution is to devise policies that reduce the share of the informal economy and put more pressure on reforming formal institutions.

Massimo Morelli, Matia Vannoni, 29 March 2021

The link between regulation and the economy has been central in political economy since the 1970s. Using data on US states from 1965 to 2012, this column argues that regulation may be good or bad for the economy depending on its type and the information and incentives of the regulators. More regulation leads to higher economic growth when that regulation is more detailed, when the current level of regulation is lower, when uncertainty is higher, and in contexts with greater competition and/or opportunity of experimentation among regulation proposers and greater accountability. 

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This advanced course focuses on financial and prudential aspects of the shadow banking sector, with some attention to its legal underpinnings.

This course will focus on:
- Shadow banking as a financial segment that expands and contracts credit outside the regulatory perimeter.
- Key elements of shadow banking regulation, emerging issues related to macro-prudential policy.
- European (as well as some US) legislation on insurance companies, money mutual funds and central clearing platforms for derivatives.
- Review of typical shadow banking funding and lending strategies.

Course Instructors: Enrico Perotti, Bart Joosen and Roger Laeven (University of Amsterdam); Iman van Lelyveld (Free University of Amsterdam and DNB)
Area: Financial Stability and Regulation
Level: Intermediate

Further information and registration: http://fbf.eui.eu/training/regulation-shadow-banks/
Registration deadline: 9 October 2017

Massimo Morelli, Moritz Osnabrügge, 26 November 2016

Italians will vote next month on constitutional reform that aims to abolish perfect bicameralism. The reform would reduce the size of the Senate, and make the Chamber of Deputies the primary legislative body. This column discusses the effects of perfect bicameralism on legislative efficiency and the relationship between executive and legislative power. The reform would see a reduction in decree laws and legislative decrees, and lead to less frequent use of the confidence question. Additionally, it would see important improvements in bureaucratic efficiency.

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