Hans Gersbach, 02 April 2011

When banks failed, the government paid up. But the bankers responsible kept their bonuses from the years of excess. This column argues for “crisis contracts”. Such contracts require that, in the event of a crisis, bank managers forfeit a portion of their past earnings to rescue the banking system.

Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf, 18 February 2011

Before the surprising 2007 collapse of Northern Rock, it was taken for granted that bank runs were things of the past. But their return and the modifications of deposit insurance schemes lead many to question the credibility of the government’s commitment. What makes a run on a bank? And when should the government intervene? This column provides some answers.

Federico Etro, 04 November 2010

Looking at the contracts for large oil paintings in Italy (1550-1750), this column finds evidence of strong competition between painters. Contracts were structured to address moral hazard problems, and prices closely reflected demand and supply conditions in an integrated market.

John Van Reenen, 04 May 2010

How can financial regulation be fixed to avoid another global crisis? This column argues that the “heads, I win; tails, society loses” moral hazard in the financial sector has to stop. To do this, policymakers must make bankruptcy credible. If a company has too much debt and becomes insolvent, it should suspend payments and its shareholders and creditors should lose their money.

Brian Bell, John Van Reenen, 03 May 2010

The global crisis has sharpened the media spotlight and political debate on bankers’ bonuses. Focusing on evidence from the UK, this column argues that to avoid excessive risk-taking in the financial sector and exploitation of moral hazard, bankers’ bonuses should be based on risk-adjusted long-run performance or be subject to “clawback” if future performance declines.

Stefano Micossi, 16 March 2010

Policymakers and commentators have suggested that large banks should be broken up. This column argues that such an idea risks the very existence of a global financial system. It outlines an alternative framework in which deposit insurance should be covered by banks not taxpayers, banks should not be guaranteed a bailout, and regulators should be mandated to step in when the warning signs begin.

Ricardo Caballero, 17 November 2009

How should governments respond to sudden failure of the financial system? This column says that it is neither credible nor desirable to refuse to assist the private sector in financial crises. It makes the case for massive provision of credible public insurance and guarantees to financial transactions and balance sheets – a financial defibrillator to respond to sudden financial arrest.

Manolis Galenianos, Nicola Persico, 08 June 2009

Drugs cause many social problems, but so does the drug war. This column suggests a novel solution that emphasises the risk of rip-offs in street sales – reducing the penalties applied to those who sell low-purity drugs. Leveraging moral hazard this way would effectively raise the wholesale price of drugs, undermining the drug market.

Michael Dooley, Peter Garber, 21 March 2009

This column argues that current account imbalances, easy US monetary policy, and financial innovation are not the causes to blame for the global crisis. It says that attacking Bretton Woods II as a major cause of the crisis is an attack on the world trading system and a sure way to metastasise the crisis in the global financial system into a crisis of the global economic system.

Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan, Luc Laeven, 04 February 2008

Over the last decade, the market for mortgage-backed securities has expanded dramatically, evolving from a small niche segment to a major portion of the overall U.S. mortgage market. The authors of CEPR DP6683 study the relationship between this recent boom and current delinquencies in the subprime mortgage market. Specifically, they analyze the extent to which this relationship can be explained by a decline in credit standards and excessive risk taking by lenders that is unrelated to improvements in underlying economic fundamentals.

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