The Barcelona Graduate School of Economics is holding an intensive course on the Competitive Effects of Mergers from November 7-9, 2018.
This three-day course will provide participants with a thorough understanding of the crucial role of competition enforcement in merger control by looking at established and new economic theories on mergers, the relevant empirical methods, as well as providing insightful discussions on recent high-profile merger cases in Europe and the US harm. The course will be taught by leading academic and professional economists:
Massimo Motta (ICREA-UPF and Barcelona GSE; former Chief Competition Economist, European Commission), course director; Giulio Federico (European Commission); Natalia Fabra (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Aviv Nevo (University of Pennsylvania; former Chief Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Elena Zoido (CompassLexecon).

Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph Clougherty, Pedro Barros, 27 February 2008

Competition authorities know that their decisions in merger cases may deter future mergers, but there’s little evidence quantifying such deterrence. This column reports on recent research that examines the deterrence effects of merger policy and finds that competition authorities’ increasing reliance on remedying mergers rather than prohibiting them is potentially weakening deterrence.


CEPR Policy Research