Competition authorities know that their decisions in merger cases may deter future mergers, but there’s little evidence quantifying such deterrence. This column reports on recent research that examines the deterrence effects of merger policy and finds that competition authorities’ increasing reliance on remedying mergers rather than prohibiting them is potentially weakening deterrence.
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