Hyunbae Chun, Kyoji Fukao, Hyeog Ug Kwon, Jungsoo Park, 06 September 2021

In many developed countries, real wage growth has lagged behind labour productivity growth in recent decades. This column uses data from Japan and Korea to study the relationship between labour productivity growth, real wage growth, and labour’s terms of trade, defined as the ratio of the consumer price index to the GDP deflator. It shows that the main reason for the real wage-labour productivity growth gap is a large decline in labour’s terms of trade. Raising real wages in the future will require policies to support the business environment and develop high value-added sectors. 

Henrique Basso, Juan F Jimeno, 29 November 2019

Advanced economies will face large demographic and radical technological change in the next decades. This column shows how demographics and endogenous technological changes, which encompass both innovation and automation, can interact to limit the future prospects for growth and alter the factor income distribution. Due to a trade-off between innovation and automation, lower fertility and population ageing are likely to generate more automation, but also lead to a reduction in GDP per capita growth and the labour income share.

Gene Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, Ezra Oberfield, Thomas Sampson, 11 November 2017

Many countries have experienced both a slowdown in aggregate productivity growth and a decline in labour’s share of national income in recent years. This column argues that the productivity slowdown may have caused the decline in labour’s income. Calibrating the authors’ model to US data suggests that a one percentage point decline in the productivity growth rate accounts for between half and all of the observed decline in the US labour share.

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