Christian Peukert, Stefan Bechtold, Michail Batikas, Tobias Kretschmer, 30 September 2020

The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation came into effect in 2018 to tackle issues of privacy and personal data. Looking at over 110,700 websites before and after the introduction of the regulation, this column examines its effect on non-EU-based websites and on other policy domains, such as competition or trade policy. Both EU-based and non-EU-based websites switched to more privacy-sensitive technologies following GDPR, but only in the short term. The market for web tracking technologies became more concentrated, with Google gaining the most market share among large providers. Privacy regulations can function as nonpecuniary barriers to trade, especially if enacted by a large economic area.

Walker Hanlon, Taylor Jaworski, 31 January 2020

The slowing pace of economic growth in the US and Europe have rekindled fears of reduced innovation and prompted calls for institutional changes meant to increase returns on spending for research and development. This column uses the case of the US interwar aircraft industry to suggest some unforeseen hazards of such change. It recommends considering the design of innovation and antitrust policy in tandem, especially where attempts to provide incentives for innovation may alter the extent of competition and endogenously reconfigure market structure.

Lawrence White, 22 August 2008

Lawrence White of New York University talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about the role of economics and economists in antitrust policy, notably for analysing the potentially anti-competitive effects of mergers, the impact of vertical restraints like bundling, and the use of predatory pricing. The interview was recorded at the American Economic Association meetings in New Orleans in January 2008.

Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken, 22 April 2008

US antitrust authorities block very few mergers. This column presents estimates of the consumer price impact of five large mergers that were allowed. Prices increased, providing one piece of evidence to support those who say US antitrust authorities are too acquiescent.


CEPR Policy Research