Elena Argentesi, Paolo Buccirossi, Emilio Calvano, Tomaso Duso, Alessia Marrazzo, Salvatore Nava, 04 March 2020

Dominant companies in the digital market may use merger and acquisitions – especially ‘killer’ or ‘zombie’ acquisitions – and the (under)enforcement of merger control to stifle competition and cement their market dominance. This column analyses acquisition activity by Amazon, Facebook, and Google between 2008 and 2018, and finds that they often targeted very young firms. Because the evolution of young firms is still uncertain, it is difficult for competition authorities to assess the effects of these mergers, especially when the focus is on single acquisitions without considering the overall acquisition strategy.

Alexandre de Cornière, Greg Taylor, 15 August 2018

A general challenge facing competition authorities in the digital era is learning how to apply the traditional tools of competition policy in multi-sided platform environments. This column argues that the Google Android case offers a great example of the need to consider the implications of the market's two-sidedness. It also argues that bundling can, in fact, be profitable by virtue of its effect on competition once one accounts for some of the key features of mobile app markets.

Cristina Caffarra, Oliver Latham, Matthew Bennett, Federico Etro, Pierre Régibeau, Robert Stillman, 27 July 2018

The European Commission’s decision to fine Google €4.34 billion for abuse of market power has been accused of being politically motivated and of risking higher prices for consumers. This column argues that the Commission’s decision has economic merit and falls within established legal precedent. As mobile search is the key gateway to access information, we should be concerned about dominance in this market for its potential distortionary effects on innovation and consumer outcomes across multiple other markets.

Events

CEPR Policy Research