When banks are too big to fail, resolution frameworks for are hobbled by the mismatch between their global nature and the national scope of regulators. This column argues that while a ‘single point of entry’ resolution is efficient, it is often incompatible with the interests of regulatory authorities, both ex ante and ex post. Taking the political constraints and incentives of national regulators into account implies that a credible resolution regime cannot be‘one size fits all’.
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