Thomas Lambert, Enrico Perotti, Magdalena Rola-Janicka, 06 July 2021

Political considerations have become important in finance research, with significant implications for policymaking. This column summarises new research presented at the CEPR conference on the Political Economy of Finance, including work on opaque investments in political influence, electoral impact of credit and regulation, the role of institutional complexity in shaping reforms and incentives of central bankers. The conference kickstarted the PolEconFin initiative aimed at providing a meeting point for researchers in this topical area.

Helios Herrera, Ronny Razin, 29 June 2021

Two years ago CEPR launched its Political Economy research group, led by Helios Herrera and Ronny Razin. As the group expands to become a programme area, they tell Tim Phillips how a lack of recognition for political economics in recent years has damaged both research and teaching — and how to repair the damage.

Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, Yoto Yotov, 18 May 2021

While the world experienced a golden age of international economic integration in the 1990s and the 2000s, in the more recent past there has been an emergence of interstate political conflicts, political polarisation, and extensive use of coercive sanctions intended to limit the international movement of goods, assets, and people. This column presents findings from the newly updated Global Sanctions Data Base, which now includes the years of the Trump presidency and provides a more comprehensive coverage of 1,101 sanction cases in the years from 1950 to 2019.

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This workshop aims to bring together leading US- and Europe-based researchers with a specific focus on developing countries, working in the fields of:

  • Political Economy
  • Economics of Conflict
  • Firms and Organizations in Developing Countries

Speakers and Programme:

  • 2:00 to 2:45 pm: Michele Di Maio (La Sapienza University Rome)
  • 2:45 to 3:30 pm: Pamela Medina Quispe (University of Toronto)
  • 3:30 to 3:40 pm: Break
  • 3:40 to 4:25 pm.: Lavinia Piemontese (ENS de Lyon)
  • 4:25 to 5:10 pm: Vasily Korovkin (CERGE-EI)
  • 5:10 to 5:20 pm: Break
  • 5:20 to 6:05 pm: Jonas Hjort (Columbia University and CEPR
  • 6:05 to 6:50 pm: Tarek Ghani (Olin Business School)

To attend the online event, please register your interest via the zoom registration page.

Organizers:

  • Mathieu Couttenier (ENS de Lyon and CEPR)
  • Lavinia Piemontese (ENS de Lyon)

Petros C. Mavroidis, André Sapir, 28 April 2021

China’s ascension to the WTO followed years of negotiations with the incumbent members and was hailed at the time as a victory for the liberal paradigm – part of the ‘end of history’. But today frictions remain. This first in a series of three columns presents the build-up to China joining the multilateral trade agreement, arguing that expectations for its subsequent behaviour were misguided from the off.

Joshua Aizenman, Hiro Ito, 07 August 2020

The political-economy trilemma, introduced by Dani Rodrik (2000), asserts that the three policy goals of national sovereignty, democracy, and globalisation, cannot all be achieved to the full extent simultaneously. This column investigates this trilemma by developing indexes that measure the extent of attainment of the three factors during 1975-2016. It finds that there is a linear relationship between globalisation and national sovereignty (i.e. a dilemma) for industrialised countries, while all three indexes are linearly correlated (i.e. a trilemma) for developing countries.

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Following the 2018 Economics and Politics at Lille ([email protected]), the 2019 Economics and Politics Workshop will take place at Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and become [email protected], jointly organized by Centre Emile Bernheim (ULB), Dulbéa (ULB), CEE (Sciences Po Paris), and LEM (University of Lille). The
workshop aims to bring together scholars from economics and political science interested in interdisciplinary work on political economy. We welcome theoretical as well as empirical papers by both economists and political scientists. Papers covering issues in all usual areas of political economy are
welcome. The workshop is intended for presentation of papers-in-progress that can benefit from discussion. Selection of papers will be based on their quality with the aim to offer a coherent programme. Submissions by graduate students and recent graduates of thesis chapters are welcome.

Workshop Organization

There are no parallel sessions. Participation in the workshop implies participation in all sessions. To facilitate and improve discussions, the time devoted to presentation and discussion will be equivalent. For each paper, at least one discussant will be designated. There is no conference fee. Young scholars
(up to two years after PhD) can apply for a scholarship.

Deadlines and submissions

Extended abstract or a copy of the paper in pdf format should be sent to [email protected] by ctober 18, 2019. Authors will be notified by November 1st and agree to send at least a draft version of their paper by December 1st, 2019.

Those interested in discussing a paper or willing to take part in the event could contact the organizers.

To support young researchers (up to two years after PhD), the organizers can cover travel expenditures and accommodation for up to four researchers (max 500 euros each). Please, indicate whether you apply for those scholarships in your submission and where you would travel from.

Nikolaus Wolf, 11 June 2018

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The scope of the event is to give participants the opportunity to present their work in progress to an audience of peers with homogeneous research interests and get valuable feedback to improve their ongoing research.

This year the event will be held in two different venues according to the following schedule:

Corte, Corse May 30th- June 2nd

Urban and regional economics and policy (May 30th-31st)
Economics of risky behavior (June 1st-2nd)

Alghero, Sardinia June 19th-22nd

Political economy (June 19th-20th), keynote speaker: James Fearon, Stanford University
Credit and financial frictions (June 19th-20th), keynote speaker: TBA
Health economics (June 21st-22nd), keynote speaker: Christopher Carpenter, Vanderbilt University
Media economics (June 21st-22nd), keynote speaker: Hal Varian, Google Inc.

The deadline for the application is 15th March 2018.

Edward Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto, 18 September 2017

Psychologists have long documented that we over-attribute people's actions to innate characteristics rather than to circumstances. This column shows that when we commit this ‘fundamental attribution error’ as voters, we over-ascribe politicians´ success to personal characteristics that merit re-election. Although this mistake can improve politicians’ incentives in ordinary times, the theory also explains lack of institutional reform and poor institutional choices, such as decreased demand for a free press and preferences for dictatorship.

Ravi Kanbur, 25 June 2017

Political economy discourses in areas such as the nature of market failure, the case for government intervention on grounds of efficiency and equity, and the interplay between economic and political forces have run for generations. This column provides an overview of the life of Nobel Prize-winning economist W Arthur Lewis, who was a critic of laissez-faire economic policies, but who also acted as a check on extreme statist interventions, arguing against heavy state subsidy to industry on purely economic grounds.

Michael Bordo, Harold James, 06 April 2015

The classic exchange-rate trilemma analysis argues that capital mobility, monetary autonomy and fixed exchange rates are incompatible. This column shows how policy trilemma analysis can be extended to other domains, specifically financial stability, political economy, and international relations. It argues that analysing these trade-offs can help to identify policy options that balance macroeconomic objectives and political realities in the face of globalisation.

Nauro Campos, 13 June 2014

The 2014 FIFA World Cup is upon us. This column argues that there will be plenty of partying, but also plenty of protests fuelled by the gross mismanagement and limited economic benefits from hosting the Cup. Stadia may be ready, but much planned infrastructure has already been abandoned. Indeed, rent-seeking may be one reason nations bid for the Cup. Since the returns to transportation infrastructure are higher in poor countries, the international community should work to stamp out corruption so that poor countries can continue to host mega-events like the World Cup.

Jeffrey Frankel, 29 April 2014

Awareness of inequality is rapidly rising. This column argues that commentators should focus on identifying the policies that are best suited to improving income distributions efficiently, and the politicians that support them. It is not sufficient to sound the alarm about inequality and the political reach of the super-rich.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Luis Garicano, Tano Santos, 24 March 2013

This paper studies the mechanisms through which the adoption of the euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Eurozone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. The authors show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident.

Robin Burgess, Peter Potapov, Stefanie Sieber, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin Olken, 22 June 2012

Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. Failure to take into account (and adjust) the extraction incentives of local politicians and bureaucrats is likely to render ineffective efforts to conserve the last great areas of tropical forest in the world.

Ronald Mendoza, 11 March 2012

Inequality in the world’s poorest countries is considered one of the main barriers to development. But this column points out that the inequality is about much more than the über-rich and the destitute – it is about access to political power. This column looks at political dynasties, where leadership is passed down through family ties, to see if these are a cause of the persistent social and economic divides.

Rohini Somanathan, Stefan Dercon, Nzinga Broussard, 27 February 2012

Food aid can prevent starvation – but only if the neediest actually receive it. CEPR DP8861 examines how food aid in Ethiopian villages can be biased away from those who need it most. Households with greater local influence or groups targeted by international agencies often receive more than they need. Knowing more about these biases, the authors conclude, can improve distribution and save lives.

Uwe Sunde, Florian Jung, 30 May 2011

This paper revisits the seminal correlation first noted by SM Lipset in 1959: Almost without exception, stable democracies are economically well-developed. Why? The authors argue that democracy will stick only in fairly balanced economic environments. Distribution appears to matter for the longevity of democracy.

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