EU Economic Policy and Architecture after Covid

The temporary suspension of the European fiscal rules to enable member states to take emergency measures against the Covid crisis offers an opportunity for an ambitious reform of a now clearly outdated fiscal framework. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that the reactivation of the rules, now foreseen in 2023, should be made contingent on a political agreement on reforming the fiscal framework, and proposes a comprehensive reform in which the new European fiscal framework would prioritise externalities arising from debt sustainability risks and demand spillovers. Fiscal targets should be differentiated depending on country vulnerabilities and implemented in a more decentralised way. 

The EU’s fiscal rules are currently suspended. If reinstated, they will need to be modified to account for the higher levels of debt. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that simple fiscal rules provide a crude and unsatisfactory assessment of debt sustainability and proposes that they be replaced with fiscal standards. In particular, it calls for qualitative prescriptions that leave room for judgement together with a process to decide whether the standards are met. This proposal envisages a larger surveillance role for independent fiscal councils and/or the European Commission, as well as a judicial body for adjudication over disputes. 

The desire to avoid credit and investment boom-bust cycles has led some to advocate replacing money creation through bank credit extension with direct money issuance by the central bank or a private entity, or linking money to an existing asset. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that relaunching the euro as digital central bank currency could help reduce the debt of the euro states and end the sovereign-bank doom loop. It would also create a formidable competitor for other global digital currencies likely to emerge in the intermediate future.

At a leaders’ summit in June 2012, euro area governments recognised the imperative of breaking the doom loop resulting from sovereigns being exposed to bank risk and vice versa. But bank regulation still treats sovereign debt as risk-free and does not penalise concentrated portfolios. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, asks whether banks would reduce portfolio concentration in response to reforms, and whether they would reduce exposures to sovereign credit risk. Simulations show that the answer is never an unambiguous and simultaneous ‘yes’ to both questions under reforms envisaged by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Calls to complement national automatic stabilisers and the ongoing financial integration in the euro area with a common fiscal instrument have provoked a mixed response. This column, part of the VoxEU debate on euro area reform, uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the euro area to show that fiscal risk sharing brings an additional layer of stabilisation compared to national stabilisers, particularly when monetary policy is constrained by the effective lower bound. It also argues that an unemployment reinsurance scheme could be designed in such a way that it would benefit all members of the currency area and would not lead to permanent transfers among countries.

Reforming the EU’s rules is particularly important at the present juncture – governments must take advantage of the current environment to prepare for the next crisis. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, outlines the European Fiscal Board’s proposals for a major overhaul of the EU fiscal framework, which it argues would result in a simpler and more transparent framework thanks to the use of a single budgetary anchor and a single observable operational target.

European fiscal rules have become overly complex over time. Some consider them too lax to ensure fiscal sustainability, while others see them as too rigid to ensure adequate smoothing of economic activity in bad times. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that to make the rules more effective, they should be simplified and focus on expenditure growth, while avoiding reliance on unobservable concepts such as structural fiscal balances. Increased ownership requires more flexibility and built-in positive incentives, such as allowing deviations when financed with GDP-linked bonds, which would also improve fiscal sustainability.

A year ago, a group of 14 French and German economists joined forces with the aim of forging common proposals for euro area reforms. Their report gave rise to a lively discussion among officials and academics. This column summarises the group's proposals and also addresses some of the points raised in a subsequent Vox debate on the topic.

Proposals for reforming the euro area back on the agenda. An overhaul of the European fiscal rules should be on high on this agenda, because the current fiscal framework has not worked well. This column proposes substituting the numerous and complex present rules with a new, simple rule focused on limiting annual growth rate of expenditures.

The proposed package of reforms from the team of French and German economists aimed at increasing the stability of the euro area has sparked a lively debate on Vox. In this column, two of the paper’s authors respond to some of the criticisms of their proposals, focusing on the broad issues of debt restructuring as ‘ultima ratio’ and regulating banks’ sovereign exposures.

The euro area debt crisis saw the region ravaged by multiple sovereign bond doom loops and has inspired several proposals for a single safe asset for the region. While a lack of political consensus has proven the main obstacle to date, technical issues relating to the complexity of splitting the existing sovereign debt stock and concerns on contagion amongst senior and junior debt structures also weigh in. This column, part of the VoxEU debate on euro area reform, illustrates how a 20-year Purple bond transition could address these issues and offer a path to genuine Eurobonds.

EU leaders addressed euro area reform at the Euro Summit on 29 June. In this column, which we add to the VoxEU debate on euro area reform, the group of 14 French and German economists behind the recent CEPR Policy Insight on the topic argue that the summit statement represents a constructive first step and crosses red lines that were considered taboos only a few months ago. However, the summit’s commitments still fall short of a comprehensive package.

The authors of the recent CEPR Policy Insight argue that the euro area needs an alternative to the current system of fiscal rules and financial penalties to discipline fiscally wayward members. This column, part of the VoxEU debate on euro area reform, argues that by not complementing their proposals with recommendations in the monetary realm, the authors have missed an opportunity to provide a balanced reform package that would not only increase fiscal discipline and risk sharing, but also enhance liquidity provision.

The euro area lacks a common safe asset, leaving banks to rely on bonds issued by their own countries and thus magnifying fiscal crises and contributing to financial fragmentation. To address this problem, an influential proposal advocates sovereign-bond backed securities, the most senior of which would play the role of safe asset. This column, which introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight, investigates whether criticism of the proposal’s reliance on securitisation is justified and compares it with alternatives that would not require tranching.

For the euro area to be stable and move forward productively, substantial improvements in its operation are required. This column, part of the VoxEU Euro Area Reform debate, argues that the proposals in the recent CEPR Policy Insight are necessary if the euro area is to avoid another catastrophic crisis and that they would go a long way towards addressing the legitimate concerns of citizens in both the core and periphery of the euro area.

Several euro area leaders have recently referred to the need to "complete the Banking Union". This column, part of VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, asks what would be required for Banking Union to be considered "complete", and makes the case for a modest approach to breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.

The key question in the policy debate on the next steps for the Economic and Monetary Union seems to be whether we can progress with integration in a context where some countries perceive themselves as consistently paying for policy mistakes of others, while others see themselves victims of a moral diktat. This column, adding to VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, argues that the policy dilemma around a central fiscal capacity can only be overcome if fiscal risk sharing and risk reduction advance in parallel. Therefore, reform of EU fiscal rules need to receive more attention. 

When thinking about what will determine the prosperity and well-being of citizens living in the euro area, five issues are central. This column, part of VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, argues that the important CEPR Policy Insight by a team of French and German economists makes an important contribution to two of them, but leaves aside some of the most crucial ones: European public goods, a proper fiscal stance and major national reforms. It also argues that its compromise on sovereign debt appears unbalanced.

There is currently both an economic and a political window of opportunity for reform in the euro area. This column, which forms part of VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals in the recent CEPR Policy Insight and makes recommendations for extensions and alternatives.

Deposit insurance, like any insurance scheme, raises moral hazard concerns. Such concerns arising from European deposit insurance can be alleviated through a country-specific component in the risk-based premium for deposit insurance and limits on sovereign bond exposures on bank balance sheets. This column, which forms part of VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, argues, however, that proposals to maintain national compartments in a new European Deposit Insurance Scheme are self-defeating, as such compartments can be destabilising in times of crisis.

The recently published CEPR Policy Insight by a team of French and German economists proposes a package of reforms to make progress on risk sharing and risk reduction in the euro area. This column, which forms part of VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, argues that while many of the package’s elements make sense, it leaves too many questions open and fails to address a number of central problems of EMU architecture.

Many EU-level reports have highlighted a European Deposit Insurance Scheme as a necessary component of banking union, but none of these options has met sufficient consensus among euro area countries. The authors of this column, which joins VoxEU's Euro Area Reform debate, propose to end the deadlock with a design that is institutionally integrated but financed in a way that is differentiated across countries.